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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
It would seem that a more steadfast faith in the ability of those who sit
in judgment of the facts in civil cases, and in the judicial safeguards erected
to insure the equality of such verdicts, would work to dispel at least some of
the misgivings of the minority. There is no doubt that the awarding of punitive
damages in a fraud and deceit action such as the instant case takes on an aura
of criminal punishment being meted out in a civil court. There is the further
possibility that the defendant may yet have another day in court, this time
criminal, in which further penalties may be exacted. But this possibility may
well be risked if the interests of both parties to an action such as the instant
case are weighed with equal vigor, as the majority has done. It is decidedly
less likely that grave injustice would be done to a defendant in the present
situation if he were in fact subjected to monetary damages in excess of the
actual amount realized by his fraudulent scheme, than if a plaintiff similar
to the one in the instant case were rendered a sum equal to the amount
actually parted with, but which in view of the expenses necessary to realize
such a verdict could well be considered to be something less than "compensatory" in practical terms. The majority has recognized the value in providing
such a plaintiff with a realistic measure of self-interest in order to induce
him to initiate a claim which otherwise might be neglected. The net result
of this view would seem to be a just one, fraught as it may be with some risk
of dual punishment for the defendant or a judicial encroachment upon a
legislative function (the imposition of punishment to deter crime). Clearly,
then, the majority has struck a balance which is not as unworkable as might
be feared.
A dutiful consideration of the public welfare recommends this holding
which provides a powerful deterrent to any illegitimate enterprise based upon
fraud and deception, which could otherwise afford to suffer its occasional day
in court if only compensatory damages were to be involved in the few civil
actions likely to be brought against it. Equally important and not to be overlooked, is the very real opportunity of creating a more favorable climate for
the legitimate business community through the resultant removal of such
enterprises.
J.P.M.
GRATUITOUS MEDICAL

Am

NOT COMPENSABLE AS TORT DAMAGES

Plaintiff is a practicing physician. In July, 1957, the auto driven by him
was struck from the rear by an auto operated by defendant. For the resulting
cervical whiplash injury, plaintiff received medical services from professional
colleagues and physiotherapy by his nurse, in each instance without out-ofpocket expense. On appeal, it was held, affirmed, that the value of medical
and nursing care and treatment rendered to the injured physician gratuitously
was not recoverable as special damages irrespective of any moral obligation on
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the physician's part to render gratuitous services in return if ever required.
Coyne v. Campbell, 11 N.Y.2d 372, 183 N.E.2d 891, 230 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1962).1
At common law, the so-called tort measure of damages was the amount
necessary to put the plaintiff in the position he would have been in but for
the act of the defendant. All expenses and loss of time became elements of
damage to be recovered from the tort-feasor. Occasionally, the plaintiff's
expenses are paid by others, or he receives gratuitous services. When this
happens, the question may arise as to whether the plaintiff has suffered damage
in respect to these items, inasmuch as his financial condition has not changed.
Most jurisdictions hold that the receipt of such financial aid from collateral
sources may not be used to diminish the amount of plaintiff's recovery, which
will include the full amount of expenses.2 The rationale of the collateral source
doctrine is that a tort-feasor should not be allowed to escape the pecuniary consequences of his wrongful act merely because his victim has received benefit
from a third party, since the defendant has caused the losses and should pay for
them.
When the New York court first considered the problem in 1880, it adopted
a rule which turned out to be completely opposite to the majority rule.3 In
considering the right to recover for loss of wages in an action for personal injuries, where it appeared that his employer voluntarily paid plaintiff's wages
during the period of disability, the Court of Appeals in Drinkwaterv. Dinsmore
observed, obiter, that an injured plaintiff may normally recover his medical
expenses, and stated that "the plaintiff must show what he paid the doctor,
and can recover only so much as he paid or was bound to pay. The defendant
may show that the plaintiff was doctored at a charity hospital, or at the
expense of the town or county, or gratuitously. In such case, the doctor's
bill could not be an element of his damage." 4 From this case the general rule
in New York evolved that there can be no recovery for medical services and
attention unless there has been an actual expenditure of money for such
services and attention, or a liability therefore has been incurred, on the theory
that the recovery must be such pecuniary damages only as the plaintiff has
actually suffered. Alabama alone follows New York in this ruling.5
All courts agree that the damages recoverable for a wrong are not diminished by the fact that the party injured has been wholly or partly indemnified
for his loss by insurance. 6 The rule is based upon the theory that the sums
1. The trial court ruled there could be no recovery for the value of these services,
absent an obligation of payment, and accordingly, excluded evidence thereof. The correctness
of this ruling was the sole issue in the. Appellate Division. 15 A.D.2d 870, 225 N.Y.S.2d 258
(4th Dep't 1962).
2. See generally 68 A.L.R.2d 875 (1958).
3. Drinkwater v. Dinsmore, 80 N.Y. 390 (1880).
4. Id. at 393.
S. Montgomery & E. Ry. Co. v. Mallette, 92 Ala. 209, 9 So. 363 (1891).
6. Farb v. Borsuk, 205 Misc. 448, 128 N.Y.S.2d 413 (Sup. Ct. 1954); Gardner v.
State, 206 Misc. 503, 133 N.Y.S.2d 852 (Ct. CI. 1954); Chernick v. Independent Am. Ice
Cream Co., 66 Misc. 177, 121 N.Y. Supp. 352 (Sup. Ct. 1910).
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paid for such insurance are in the nature of an investment, which, like other
investments made by the plaintiff, ought not to inure to the benefit of the
defendant wrongdoer. 7 Even in New York, there will be no deduction for payments received by the plaintiff in the form of insurance, sick leave, annual
leave, disability compensation, or workmen's compensation.8
The Court in the instant case applied the strict New York rule and held
that the plaintiff is entitled to recover only his pecuniary losses, of which gratuitous services were not an item. 9 The Court thus decided that the rule
established in 1880 is still prevailing law in New York.10 The Court seems to
fear that if it required a defendant to pay the plaintiff the reasonable value
of the services of the physician who treated him gratuitously, it would be
requiring the defendant to pay the plaintiff the value of a gift and thus the
plaintiff would be benefiting from his injury. The Court was not swayed by
the argument that having accepted gratuitous services, the plaintiff is under
a moral obligation to return the generosity. The majority replied that a moral
obligation, without more, will not support a claim for legal damages. In any
event such a moral obligation is not an injury for which tort damages, which
must be compensatory only, may be awarded." The Court also followed the
New York doctrine when it refused to apply the rule applied to insurance
cases. In such a New York case, the Court said it was error to permit defendants
to establish on cross-examination that plaintiff was a member of a health insur2
ance plan and that he was receiving increased disability pension benefits.1
The Court distinguished the cases by saying that in the insurance case, the plaintiff had given value for the benefits he received-thus, the Court did not
there pass on a situation where the injured plaintiff received wholly gratuitous
services for which he had given no consideration and which he was under no
legal obligation to repay. The dissenting judge, however, failed to see the
distinction. He would not limit the rationale of the collateral source doctrine to
cases where the plaintiff had previously paid consideration.
In the spring session of 1957, a bill was introduced in the New York State
Senate i3 and Assembly' 4 to amend the Civil Practice Act by adding a new provision, section 479-a. The proposed section would have regulated the effect
of collateral payments on a recovery for personal injury.5 The proposal
7. 26 Fordham L. Rev. 380 (1957).
8. Landon v. United States, 197 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1952); Seidel v. Maynard, 279
App. Div. 706, 108 N.Y.S.2d 450 (4th Dep't 1951); Lassell v. City of Gloversville, 217 App.
Div. 323, 217 N.Y. Supp. 128 (3d Dep't 1926) ; Bethlehem Properties, Inc. v. McGovern, Inc.,
161 Misc. 111, 291 N.Y. Supp. 217 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
9. Drinkwater v. Dinsmore, supra note 3.
10. Leon v. United States, 193 F. Supp. 8 (E.D.N.Y. 1961); DePaulis v. United
States, 193 F. Supp. 7 (E.D.N.Y. 1961).
11. Cf. Steitz v. Gifford, 280 N.Y. 15, 19 N.E.2d 661 (1939)
12. Healy v. Rennert, 9 N.Y.2d 202, 173 N.E.2d 777, 213 N.Y.S.2d 44 (1961).
13. N.Y. Senate Int. No. 264 (1957).
14. N.Y. Assembly Int. No. 361 (1957).
15. As proposed, it provided:
In an action for personal injuries the damage recoverable shall not be reduced
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was passed by the Senate but was not acted upon in the Assembly Codes
Committee. The Law Revision Commission argued that the New York rule
should be changed for two basic reasons. First, the New York rule is too
difficult to administer because the rule requires the courts to discriminate
between those payments which will reduce damages and those which will be
disregarded (such as insurance cases), and secondly, the New York rule fails
to recognize and implement the deterrent function of tort damages by allowing
some defendants to escape some of the unpleasant consequences of the wrongdoing by virtue of the accidental fact that the plaintiff has received gratuitous
services.'6 The Law Revision Commission, therefore, strongly recommended
that New York change its law to conform to the great weight of authority in
the United States.
In supporting the New York rule, the Court argued that since the New
York Legislature did not deem it wise to pass the proposed legislation in 1957,
the Court would not now overrule the Legislature's decision and change one of
the basic laws of the state. The Court seems to have forgotten, however, that
this is a court-made policy which may be overruled by the Court at any time.
But, merely because New York is one of only two states in the country which
deny recovery for the value of gratuitous services, it does not necessarily
follow that this policy is wrong. In the field of negligence, a principle of payment for gratuitous service is contrary to reason, logic, and the best interests
of society. The law of damages has long been held to be twofold, i.e., either
compensatory or punitive. Any recovery in negligence should be based upon
compensation for damages proximately caused by such negligence. The plaintiff
has the burden of proving all losses. If the Court adopted the theory that
gratuitous services are losses, the Court would be requiring the plaintiff to
prove that which he might have lost but did not, and would be allowing the
plaintiff to be paid for what could have been a loss but was not.
M. A. K.
GYMNASIUm'S

CONTRACTUAL

DISCLAIMER

OF

LIABILITY

FOR

NEGLIGENCE

GIVEN EFFECT

Defendant corporation franchises a coast-to-coast system of gymnasiums
providing exercise facilities and instruction. The right to use the facilities and
to receive instruction during business hours is provided in a single page
membership contract which contains a clause exempting Vic Tanney Gyms
from liability for negligence. Plaintiffs, husband and wife, brought a negligence
action for personal injury and sequential damages suffered as the result of a
by reason of the fact that the injured person has received payments of wages,

salary, medical or other expenses, or other monies or aid, whether gratuitous or
otherwise, from any person, unless the payment or aid was made or rendered by
or on behalf of a person who was or may be liable to the injured person for causing
such injuries or who was or may be liable to the injured person for the act or
omission of the person who caused them.
16.

N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 65(G) (1957).

